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Turkey as a “Willing Receiver” of
American Soft Power: Hollywood
Movies in Turkey during the Cold War
BURCU SARI KARADEMIR
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT Defining the relationship between the US and Turkey as one in which Turkey was
a “willing receiver,” this study illuminates the general question of how Turkey’s foreign policy
orientation is relevant to the analysis of the success of US soft power in Turkey during the Cold
War. For this purpose, it focuses on the centrality of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation in
facilitating the popular reception of Hollywood movies in Turkey by looking at how Turkey
interpreted its regulations on films in favor of original or remakes of Hollywood movies.
The paper concludes that while setting the scene for both the popularity of American movies
and the effective use of US soft power strategies, Turkey’s foreign policy orientation had
far-reaching consequences for the development of the Turkish movie sector.
Introduction
The concept of soft power illuminates the inextricably intertwined relationship
between politics and culture.1 Soft power suggests that intangible capabilities such
as cultural means can serve one’s political objectives by inciting attraction and
becoming a role model. Rather than coercion or imposition, attraction is the foun-
dation of the relationship between the holder and the receiver of soft power. In this
regard, the logic of soft power implies that the effectiveness of its strategies
depends largely on the “willing receivers.”2 Factors that may contribute to willing-
ness are ideological, political and cultural affinities with the source of the soft
power. According to this, the Western bloc countries were more susceptible to
American soft power than they were to Soviet soft power.
The Cold War was a time when the US engaged in severe cultural warfare through
the design, production and dissemination of images and representations to promote its
way of life as better than the Soviet way.3 Standard accounts of US cultural warfare in
the Cold War era tell us how successfully the US used virtually every cultural
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medium, from art exhibitions to books and education, as a “weapon of mass attrac-
tion.”4 These studies also note Hollywood movies’ crucial role in promoting Amer-
ican culture, ideology, lifestyle and values throughout the world.5 Different from
these accounts of US cultural warfare, this study underlines the centrality of
Turkish foreign policy orientation in facilitating the success of Hollywood movies
in Turkey in the Cold War era. It defines the relationship between the US and
Turkey as one in which Turkey is not a passive receiver but a willing one. Further-
more, the study explores the impact of Hollywood movies on Turkish movies and dis-
cusses the far-reaching consequences of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation on the
Turkish movie sector.
The study first briefly underlines the significance of Turkish2American relations
in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation during the Cold War. Second, it
explores how Turkey’s foreign policy orientation influenced the interpretation of
its regulations on film production, distribution and exhibition and increased US influ-
ence on the Turkish movie sector. Third, it provides examples of Turkish movies that
were influenced by Hollywood movies. The article concludes that Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation, which made the country a willing receiver of American soft
power, set the scene for the popularity of American movies and the development
of the Turkish movie sector and facilitated the effective use of US soft power
strategies.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Orientation and Turkish2US Relations in the
Cold War Era
Turkey’s Western foreign policy orientation can be traced back to the Ottoman
Empire, which started to seek recognition from the European great power to be
included in the great powers’ club in the eighteenth century.6 During its republican
era, Turkey preserved that Western orientation and sought to locate itself in the
West as a modern state that met the standards of the civilized world. As International
Relations (IR) scholar Pınar Bilgin stated, Turkey’s “Westernness” became a crucial
security and foreign policy objective for the young Turkish Republic.7 In pursuit of
this objective, Turkey engaged in an unprecedented reform movement, highly revo-
lutionary and secular in character, to “raise national culture to the level of contempor-
ary civilization” and modernize Turkey’s economical, political, societal and cultural
life.8 In IR, Turkey followed the principle formulated by Ataturk, “Peace at home,
peace abroad” and focused on preserving the balances and equality established
with the European states by the Treaty of Lausanne.9 However, despite the great
achievements of Lausanne, the European great powers did not recognize Turkey’s
Westernness; and it is still being questioned abroad, as well as at home, as may be
observed by the recent European Union accession negotiations.10
Moreover, Turkish political leadership’s pragmatic strategy, which was based on
keeping Turkey at peace by assuring its impartiality, did not help the country’s
search for recognition by the West. In the wake of World War II, IRs were restruc-
tured in line with the changing balance of power. The European great powers not






























only lost their influential positions in world politics but also became dependent on the
US for recovery and reconstruction. Hence, the US became the leader of the West.
When the competition between the Soviets and the US turned into the Cold War,
the leaders of both blocs played major roles in choosing the states that were essential
for the security of their respective territories and interests. The US initially did not
consider Turkey as a crucial member of the West; however, it changed its position
due to the Soviets’ demands regarding Turkish territory, the Turkish Straits and
Turkey’s strategic importance in the context of the Cold War.11 In 1947, US president
Harry Truman declared that the US would provide economic aid to Turkey (and
Greece) to support their resistance to “attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures.”12 In 1948, Turkey started to receive US economic aid,
known as the Marshall Plan.
However, growing economic and political relations with the US did not secure
Turkey’s Westernness. The most important institution in the West was NATO
membership in this organization signified one’s Westernness and granted military
security. For instance, as IR scholars Hemmer and Katzenstein argued, the US alli-
ance with European states in NATO was the institutionalization of a political creation
based on perceptions of collective identity emanating from historical, political and
cultural factors.13 Turkey applied to be part of NATO’s defense and identity collec-
tive in May 1950, but the British and the Americans declined its application on the
grounds that “Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and
consequently she could not join the North Atlantic regional group.”14 Despite this
rejection, as a country that constructed its identity in terms of Western civilization
and envisioned its future in the West, Turkey continued to make considerable
efforts to secure its place in the Western overlay and its recognition as a Western
country.15 The Turkish government’s decision to send soldiers to the Korean War
under the auspices of the United Nations, even without the Turkish parliament’s
approval, became very influential in facilitating Turkey’s acceptance to NATO in
1952.16 From the Turkish perspective, membership in NATO institutionalized
Turkey’s place in the West; its Westernness was finally recognized.17
Turkey’s membership in NATO also broadened the Turkish conception of the
West. Compared to the war-stricken and devastated Europe, the US was an attractive
model for Turkey’s ongoing project of modernization and Westernization. Turkey
thus changed its reference for democracy and economic development from Europe
to the US. The US became so attractive to Turkish politicians that transforming
Turkey into a “little America” became a non-partisan state promise, which was
repeated on October 21, 1957 by President Celal Bayar’s Taksim address to the
people: “We are emulating the development stages of America. Thirty years from
now, this country will be a little America with 50 million people.”18 Consequently,
American culture and lifestyle became popular objects of desire in Turkey.
Despite the strong ties established by the Western alliance, Turkish2American
relations had their low periods.19 For instance, bilateral relations were strained
when the US ignored Turkey’s interests by using the İncirlik airbase to transport
troops to Lebanon in 1958, and when it bargained over removing Jupiter missiles






























in Turkey without Turkey’s knowledge during the Cuban missile crisis.20 In 1974, the
US declared its impartiality on the Cyprus issue and sent the Johnson Letter urging
Turkey not to intervene. After Turkey did, the US imposed an arms embargo on
the country. Later, when the US demanded the ban of opium poppy cultivation, US2
Turkish relations took another downturn. However, as IR scholar and historian Nur
Bilge Criss stated, despite fluctuations Turkey and the US have always managed to
restore their special ties, which has mitigated an anti-American tone that contextually
became dominant in Turkish public opinion (with the minor exception of a few left-
wing groups in Turkey).21 In this regard, America remained an object of attraction at
state and societal levels and American movies became the conveyors of American
culture and lifestyle to Turkey’s willing receivers.
Institutions for Regulating Movies in Turkey
In line with its pro-American foreign policy orientation, the Turkish state individually
and in cooperation with the US prepared structural conditions that would facilitate the
reception of American movies in Turkey. First, Turkish authorities (re)interpreted the
articles of the Regulation on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays, also known
as the Censorship Statute.22 From 1939 to 1985, this statute was the only regulation
pertaining to movies that Turkey had. When the Turkish government introduced it in
1939, its aim was to prevent Turkish audiences from taking sides in the ideological
clashes presented in movies, as was happening in Europe.23
The regulation prohibited ideological propaganda in favor of a particular state, pro-
hibited offending friendly states and their nations and prohibited propagating ideol-
ogies contrary to Turkey’s national political, economic and ideological system.
Additionally, it banned the shooting of movies that were considered harmful to mor-
ality and discipline, opposed to national feeling or a danger to public order and secur-
ity. Furthermore, movies that made anti-war propaganda, denigrated the honor and
dignity of the military and military service, included propaganda scenes against
Turkey, were offensive to a race or nation or made religious propaganda were
outlawed.24
As a member of the Western alliance, Turkish authorities (re)interpreted the
articles mentioned above accordingly. They began to use the regulation to block
movies they considered contrary to the above-mentioned clauses.25 According to
Film Historian Nijat Özön, the foreign film commission banned all Soviet pro-
ductions, citing the clauses that prohibited political propaganda in favor of a particu-
lar state and propagation of political, economic and social ideologies hostile to
Turkey.26 Obviously, the aim was to prevent Soviet influence in Turkey.27 Films
imported from communist countries were censored heavily. The control was so
strict that even Cyrillic titles and themes of solidarity or communality were not tol-
erated. For instance, the Turkish Board of Censorship allowed The Journey
(Anatole Litvak-1959), a movie about a group of Westerners trying to flee
Hungary after the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, only if the
phrase “Russians are nice” were omitted during the dubbing.28 The political,






























structural and legal factors that outlawed movies of Soviet ideology at the same time
promoted Western movies and favored American ones.29 As a consequence, starting
in the 1950s, Hollywood movies started to dominate the Turkish market.
The second mechanism that controlled and facilitated the dissemination of Amer-
ican movies in Turkey was the United States Information Service (USIS),30 a branch
of the United States Information Agency (USIA), established to construct the Amer-
ican image in foreign countries that were under the threat of communism. The USIS
censored several American movies in Turkey that they determined were contrary to
true representations of the American lifestyle. For example, The Gentleman’s Agree-
ment (on anti-Semitism in the United States), The Attack (a story of military incom-
petence in World War II), All the King’s Men (on soldiers’ personal and
psychological difficulties in returning to civilian life) and The Blackboard Jungle
(which criticized the American high school system) were all censored.31 On the
other hand, the USIA facilitated the distribution of other American movies by includ-
ing Turkey in its Information Media Guaranty (IMG) Program.32 Turkish film impor-
ters were experiencing serious problems paying American film distributors due to the
scarcity of dollars in Turkey; the IMG arranged that Turkish importers could pay their
debts in Turkish lira through monthly installments over 1 year.
The Turkish Censorship Statute and the USIS in Turkey definitely facilitated pla-
cement of American films in Turkish movie theatres, but there were no competitors.
The European film industry was in crisis due to the economic destruction in Europe
and Turkey’s own film industry was in its infancy. Neither, then, was in a position to
present an alternative to Turkish audiences and compete with the successful market-
ing strategies of American movies.33 Hence, the interventions of the Turkish and US
governments provided favorable institutional conditions for the distribution and exhi-
bition of American movies and shaped the preferences of Turkish audiences.
The Impact of American Movies on the Turkish Film Industry
The ascendancy of American films in the Turkish market in the early 1950s coincided
with the ruling Republican Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) decision to support the
Turkish national movie sector by offering a 50 percent tax reduction for movie thea-
ters willing to screen Turkish movies.34 As the subsequent ruling party, the Democrat
Party (DP, Demokrat Parti) preserved the decision. Under the DP rule, newly rich
Anatolian businessmen were encouraged to invest in the movie sector.35 However,
in the volatile economic and political context of Turkey, filmmaking was a very
risky venture. For this reason, film producers developed risk-reducing production
strategies, such as making movies in genres that were in demand, i.e. American-
style films. During the mid-1950s and 1960s, the Turkish film industry’s peak
years, Turkish filmmakers produced over 300 movies per year.36
Encouraged by this success, film producers claimed that Yeşilçam (the name for
the Turkish film industry) was “little Hollywood,” much like Turkish politicians
wanted to make Turkey “little America.”37 However, because the most popular
movies genre in Turkey at that time was Hollywood melodramas, the Turkish film






























industry never moved beyond producing spin-offs, remakes and adaptations of Amer-
ican films.38 Turkish melodramatic cinema shared the major characteristics of the
American melodrama genre. These movies focused on love affairs and family
relations, supported morally conservative values and the political status quo and
depicted stereotypes, extreme emotions and moral binaries.39 Typical Yeşilçam
melodramas based their narratives on rich/poor, rural/urban and east/west binaries.
According to these themes, the urban rich represented the West and the Western
life-style was characterized by elements of capitalist modes of consumption and pro-
duction. Male protagonists drove American cars, owned factories, wore suits, were
educated in the US or Europe, drank whiskey and smoked Marlboros. Likewise,
female protagonists dressed in haute couture Western-style clothing, wore expensive
jewelry and organized parties.40
One of the most-repeated narratives in Yeşilçam was the following: a boy from the
urban upper class and a girl from the lower class had an affair, and the boy suddenly
left the girl. The girl followed the boy but he rejected her because she did not belong
to his class and did not know how to act, eat, speak, etc. After being rejected, the girl
was distraught and decided to transform herself into a new and modern woman. In a
very short time, with the help of European teachers living in Turkey, she learned
proper etiquette, acted like a lady, lost her heavy accent, dressed like an upper-
class Western woman and then, as planned, met the boy in her new form. The boy
failed to recognize her but fell in love. This time, exacting revenge, the girl left the
boy. In the end, the girl’s identity was revealed, the boy was taught his lesson and
they reunited. After they were married, they lived as members of the upper class,41
acting out the “Turkish dream” happily ever after.
In line with the features of the melodrama genre, the stark binaries in the represen-
tations of the male and female characters were in accordance with the dominant ideol-
ogy of the state. Turkey has been defined as a homogenous, harmonious society in
absolute national solidarity exempt from class and class conflict.42 Therefore, in
Turkish melodramas, rich and poor were not seen through a class lens because
there was no place for class-consciousness or class conflict.43 Class mobility was a
frequent theme, and could easily be achieved through changes in income and/or edu-
cation. In addition, Turkish melodramas consciously did not portray an enmity
against wealth. Rich characters were represented as both good and bad; good rich
characters always helped the poor protagonist to transform herself/himself, while
bad rich characters were usually taught a lesson. The common lesson for the rich
was to understand that family/friends/lovers were more important than wealth; there-
fore, rich and poor were often portrayed sharing bread and enjoying the ordinary life
of the poor.44
In this regard, Yeşilçam melodramas, which were seemingly devoid of ideologi-
cal content, functioned in fact as a tool for disseminating state ideology, which itself
was shaped by Turkey’s foreign policy orientation.45 Melodramas helped establish
social peace, harmony and order in line with the Turkish state’s objectives. The pol-
itical coding hidden in the happy endings facilitated the establishment of Turkey’s
Westernness, just like American movies strived to promote a particular kind of






























Americanness.46 Moreover, in portraying Westernness and modernity in reference
to the American lifestyle, Yeşilçam melodramas acted in alliance with the Holly-
wood movies that aimed to promote the American lifestyle as opposed to the com-
munist lifestyle in the context of the Cold War. In the end, then, Turkish
melodramas were repetitions of their American counterparts in kind and also in
purpose.
Turkey’s Remakes of American Movies
Starting from the late 1960s, Turkish film producers faced a decline in the industry47
and decided to remake some of the popular Hollywood films. These remakes differed
from typical Yeşilçam fare and were called “fantastic Turkish movies”48 because
their narratives relied on fairy tales, science fiction and Westerns. Because of the
peculiarities of the American originals, these movies were translated into the
Turkish context historically, culturally and politically.49
Important examples of “adapted” movies included: Snow White and the Seven
Dwarves (Ben Shartsteen—1937) into Pamuk Prenses ve 7 Cüceler (Ertem
Göreç—1970), The Wizard of Oz (Victor Fleming—1939) into Ayşecik ve Sihirli
Cüceler Rüyalar Ülkesinde (Tunç Başaran—1971), The Invisible Man Returns
(John May—1940) into Görünmeyen Adam İstanbul’da (Lütfi Ö. Akad—1955),
Dr. No (Terence Young—1962) into Altın Çocuk Beyrut’ta (Ertem Göreç—1967),
Mysterious Dr. Satan (John English, William Witney—1940) as Yılmayan Şeytan
(Yılmaz Atadeniz—1972), Star Wars (George Lucas—1977) as Dünyayı Kurtaran
Adam (Çetin İnanç—1982), Dracula (Bela Lugosi—1931) as Drakula İstanbul’da
(Mehmet Muhtar—1953), The Exorcist (William Peter Blatty—1972) as Şeytan
(Metin Erksan—1974), The Lone Ranger (William Withey—1933) as Maskeli
5’ler (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1968) and Maskeli Beşlerin Dönüşü (Yılmaz Atadeniz—
1968), Jaws (Steven Spielberg—1975) as Çöl (Çetin İnanç—1983), The Mask of
Zorro (Ferd Niblo—1921) and The Mask of Zorro (Rouben Mamaulian—1940) as
Zorro Kamçılı Süvari (Yılmaz Atadeniz—1969), Zorro’nun İntikamı (Yılmaz Atade-
niz—1969), Zorro Dişi Fantoma’ya Karşı (Feridun Kete—1969) and Zorro’nun
Kara Kamçısı (Feridun Kete—1969).50
In the Turkish version of The Exorcist, in the exorcism ceremony an Imam
(rather than a priest) uses Zamzam water (taken from the holy well of Zamzam
in Mecca) instead of Christian holy water and reads from the Quran. In addition,
the main character visits a mosque after defeating the devil in her soul.51 In The
Man Who Saved the World, which was the Turkish version of Star Wars, the pro-
tagonist was told that Islam was the source of civilization and he was expected to
save the world from attacks of evil. In Superman, Superman was told that his intel-
ligence came from the Prophet Solomon. Count Dracula was repelled not only by
garlic but also by the Quran. Also, due to problems with equipment in Turkey at the
time, Superman rarely flew. In order to justify this change from the original, extra
dialogue was added in the last scene: a friend of Clark Kent asks him why he
chooses to ride on an airplane to return home and Kent replies, “Because I only






























fly when dealing with the bad guys.”52 There were also a large number of Turkish
Westerns produced, which pictured absurdities such as Turkish villagers in
Mexican hats and Turkish actors as cowboys and sheriffs. A more illustrative
(and disheartening) indication of how much American movies had shaped the
Turkish psyche was Düşman Yolları Kesti (The Enemy Cut off the Roads).53
This film was supposed to be a Turkish National War movie but it was shot as a
Western because Turkish audiences considered American-type adventure movies
more exciting.54
Turkish authorities did not consider these remakes as ideological propaganda. The
Turkish law that banned another state’s propaganda was not interpreted in such a way
as to forbid Turkish film stars from acting out Western roles, such as Ayhan Işık with
a sheriff’s badge, Erol Taş wearing a Mexican hat or Cüneyt Arkın and Salih Güney
riding horses through orchards as cowboys. However, in the Cold War context, it
would not be wrong to assume that if these actors carried a flag with a hammer
and sickle on it, appeared as trade union members, read Das Kapital or talked
about class-consciousness, the law would have been interpreted otherwise. Hence,
although the leisure activity of watching movies did not seem to be an ideological
act, the production and distribution of filmmaking were definitely shaped by
Turkey’s ideological stance in the Cold War.
Despite the efforts of Turkish film producers, toward the end of the Cold War, the
Turkish film industry suffered a serious decline and the dominance of local pro-
ductions came to an end by the late 1970s. After the economic crisis in the West
due to the increase in the oil prices by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries in 1973 and the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, the Turkish
economy declined. The general unrest in society due to political polarization (as
well as the increasing prices of cinema tickets) further discouraged moviegoers.
The Turkish audience now preferred to watch television at home. Film producers
attempted to keep the sector alive by producing sex and comedy films,55 but after
the coup d’état of 1980, the military government started to ban such movies, claim-
ing they contributed to a decline in morality. As a result, many movie companies and
movie theaters started to close. In the 1980s, the dissemination of Video Cassette
Recorders (VCRs) further harmed the sector. By 1991, the number of cinemas
had declined from 2,242 in 1970 to 281, an 87 percent drop.56 Hollywood movies
did fill the gap left by Turkish movies, especially after changes in the foreign
capital regulations in 1987 came into effect, because foreign distributors were
able to enter the Turkish market without an intermediary. Thus, American firms
such as Warner Bros. and United International Pictures started to directly distribute
both local and foreign films in Turkey. As Turkish firms could not compete with
American distributors, the collapse of Yeşilçam became inevitable.57
Conclusion
The Cold War period was an extraordinary era in which the entwined relationship
between politics and culture could be observed through the US’ understanding of






























the central role that soft power media play in shaping people’s minds and affecting
their hearts and minds. As standard accounts of US soft power frequently state, Hol-
lywood movies were among the most significant and efficient “weapons of mass
attraction,” which disseminated the idea that the American way of life was superior
to the alternative presented by the Soviets. The American way was as well received
in most parts of the world as it was in Turkey. Different from other studies, this
study investigated the reception of Hollywood movies in Turkey in the Cold War
era by exploring the concept that Turkey was a “willing receiver” of American
culture and lifestyle due to its Western-oriented foreign policy. The effect of US
soft power on Turkey may not have been as strong if Turkey had not wanted to
situate itself in the West from the beginning, or if the US had not facilitated
Turkey’s membership in the Western family of states by (eventually) supporting
its application to NATO or if Europe had preserved its attraction for Turkey. In
other words, Turkey’s political will facilitated the success of US soft power in
Turkey.
The study illustrated how Turkey’s foreign policy orientation facilitated the
reception of American movies by noting that Turkish authorities interpreted the
articles of the Regulation on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays, also
known as the Censorship Statute, to favor American movies. Turkey did not
allow movies contradicting its national ideology of Westernness or propagandizing
“wrong” images or misrepresentations of that ideology. Therefore, Hollywood
movies beat out socialist-inclined movies. Choosing between the options allowed
by the censorship authorities, the Turkish audience preferred high-quality Holly-
wood movies to the products of the newborn Turkish cinema sector. However,
when Turkish movie producers started to imitate Hollywood movies that received
popular receptions to make more profit, Turkish audiences favored the movies.
Therefore, Hollywood movies directly and indirectly exerted US soft power in
Turkey because both the original movies and their remakes were products of
Western ideology.
However, it should be noted that although Hollywood movies contributed to
the growth of the Turkish film sector in its initial phase by guaranteeing public
demand, it did not take Yeşilçam film producers long to fall into a vicious
circle of producing movies that were imitations of imitated movies. This profit-
oriented production strategy was the catalyst for the decline of Yeşilçam.
Unstable political and economic conditions, three coup d’états and the prolifer-
ation of television and VCRs were other contributing factors. In addition, techno-
logical, professional and financial issues prevented the production of movies of
artistic value. By the end of the Cold War, the Turkish film sector could not
compete with American, let alone European films. Thus, taken as a whole,
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation during the Cold War facilitated conditions
for the effective use of US soft power strategies and the success of American
movies in Turkey but also set the scene for the development—and near
demise—of the Turkish movie sector.
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49. Savaş Arslan, “Hollywood Alla Turca: A History of Cinema in Turkey” (unpublished PhD
dissertation, Ohio State University, 2006).
50. Scognamillo and Demirhan (1999), the Internet Movie Data Base.
51. Iain Robert Smith, “The Exorcist in Istanbul: Processes of Transcultural Appropriation within Turkish
Popular Cinema,” Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1–12.
52. Scognamillo and Demirhan (1999), p. 387.
53. Directed by Osman F. Seden in 1959. Available at http://www.sinematurk.com/film_genel/3104/
Dusman-Yollari-Kesti (accessed February 2, 2011).
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